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Abstract:
We present in this report a study and implementation of a monitoring system for Android appli-
cations.
We have first analyzed the requirements of the system; then, we have defined a set of
specifications; and, finally, we have proposed a technical solution.
The proposed system is called Mono and is designed to capture traffic and retrieve information
of interest for a forensics analyst about a given application (e.g. files accessed, etc.). It is
composed of three elements:
• an Android application implementing a VPN client
• a VPN server with a public IP address that can capture, decrypt (under certain conditions)
and store packets. It also runs a web server
• a web interface to examine in real-time the traffic of the VPN tunnel.
This first version of the Mono system, is available on GitHub under the MIT license (https:
//github.com/gcanal/Mono)
Figure 1: VPN-based web packet capturer
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Digital Forensics can be defined as the use of scientific methods to find evidences in digital
sources such as computers, tablets, mobile phones, databases, Network Interface Controllers
(NICs), smart devices, etc. These evidences may be used to “support or refute a hypothesis”[27]
in a public or a private investigation (about criminal activities, intrusions, etc.).
Network forensics is a “sub-branch of digital forensics relating to the monitoring and analysis
of computer networks” [29].
ANFORA (ANa´lisis FORense Avanzado) is a Spanish research project conducted by the In-
formation Security Group of the UPC that is aimed at the innovation in digital forensics. Among
its fields of research is the creation and improvement of tools and techniques to ease the work
of analysts in digital and network forensics.
In the context of this research project, we present this work that addresses the needs of
automation and better user experience in network forensics analysis.
The goal of this work is to create a monitoring system for mobile applications; a tool to
assist forensics analysts in detecting and analyzing data connections performed from/to a mobile
device. We are specifically interested in:
• data flows from/to the different mobile applications,
• files that have been accessed (in read or write mode) during the session.
The proposed monitoring system should be started and stopped by the so-called operator.
The period during which the system remains active is called a session.
In the following, we define the desired functionalities for the system. A priority is assigned
to each functionality, being P1 the highest priority.
• (P1) List IP packets with their content.
• (P2) Download selected packets for further analysis with Wireshark.
• (P3) List IP, UDP and TCP conversations.
• (P4) Enable search by keyword in packet header and payload.
• (P5) Decrypt SSL/TLS traffic, whenever possible.
• (P6) List information of each IP address, the mobile device connects to (name resolution,
geographic location, appearances in abuse databases, ...)
• (P7) List files accessed (read and write mode) during the session by each application (only
possible with rooted/jailbroken device).
There are however some constraints that have been identified:
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• (C1) External storage: The recorded information must not be stored on the device itself,
but on another one with enough free disk space.
• (C2) Real time: The information (e.g. packets), must be made available while recording.
The user must be able to perform live operations (inspect packets, see current connections,
search in payloads)
• (C3) Support for non-rooted or jailbroken devices: The functionalities should work, to
the extent possible, on non-rooted (Android) or non-jailbroken (iOS) devices.
• (C4) Forensics friendly: The interface should be intuitive and easy to use.
• (C5) Android approach: Due to time constraints, this project is only initially developed
for Android devices.
The rest of this document will be structured as follows.
After carrying out research on the current state-of-the-art technologies in chapter 2, we will
describe the process of elaborating a technical solution in chapter 3. In this chapter, we will
establish the architecture of the Mono system based on the list of constraints. A VPN
Following chapters 4, 5 and 6 will explain how we implemented a first version of the Mono
system with the most desired features, each chapter corresponding to a given component of this
system.
Chapter 4 will be devoted to the Android device. We will see how to set up a VPN tunnel
by using the application OpenVPN for Android.
In chapter 5, we will expose the two main components of the monitoring server: a packet
capturer working with the scapy library coded in python 3 [16] and a traffic decoder using the
mitmproxy scripting Application Programming Interface (API) also coded in python 3 [23].
Chapter 6 is the most substantial of this report and details the Mono user interface: a Web
application programmed with the Angular JS JavaScript framework. We will introduce this
framework and explain the software architecture of this web application.
In chapger 7, we will evoke security threats and their possible countermeasures.
Finally, in chapter 8 we will present the conclusions of this work and the potential future
work.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
The objective of this section is to evaluate if there are existing software that fulfill the specifica-
tions of our system, to get insights on the technology they used and, if possible, to reuse their
code in our application (provided that the code is open-source).
Our core functionality being the acquisition of packets sent and received by the device, we
are specifically interested in open-source Android packet capturers. In section 2.1, we will assess
if they respect the constraints specified in the project requirements.
Section 2.2, will provide more details about each software.
Finally, in section 2.3, we will describe the two main methods to capture packets that we
found during our investigation.
2.1 Analysis of Android Packet Capturers (Summary)
2.1.1 Respect of Constraints
During the analysis, special care must be taken to ensure that the constraints we were given
(besides C5) are respected.
• (C1) External storage: This constraint is not respected if the capture is executed directly
on the phone. Even if there is an export function to transfer the data on another device,
the program might run out of memory during long captures.
• (C2) Real time: The program has to allow live packet inspection
• (C3) Support for non rooted Android devices: A maximum number of functionalities
must work on non rooted devices. For instance, the program must be able to capture all
traffic (Wi-Fi and 3G/4G) without needing to root the analyzed device.
• (C4) Forensics friendly: The level of detail required by a network forensics analyst require
a user-friendly and agile interface which is hard to achieve on a mobile phone. Therefore,
we will give priority to systems that allow to read/inspect the results of the device analysis
directly from a desktop PC or a laptop.
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Android tcpdump [46] 7 3 7 7 18/01/2017 3 Yes - 3
SSL Packet Capture [44] 7 3 3 7 19/10/2015 Yes 4.0+ 3
tPacketCapture [45] 7 3 3 7 19/10/2015 Yes 4.0+ 3
SimplePacketCapture [40] 7 3 7 7 29/12/2013 Yes 2.1+ 3
Android Packet Capture [47] 7 3 7 7 03/07/2016 3 Yes - -
Wicap Sniffer [38] 7 3 7 7 29/07/2016 Yes 4.1+ 3
SniffDroid [43] 7 3 7 7 17/09/2013 ? ? 2.2+ 3
Packet Sniffer [37] 7 3 7 7 19/10/2015 Yes 1.6+ 3
bitShark [39] 7 3 7 7 19/10/2015 Yes 2.3+ 3
Table 2.1: Packet capture applications for Android
Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of packet capturers in Android, where can see two main
trends in the technology used:
1. Use a rooted device with the libcap library or the tcpdump binary (which is a compiled
version of the libpcap library).
2. Use a VPN on a non rooted device to capture the packets from all the applications.
Both techniques will be described with more details in section 2.3. The latter one seems the
most interesting to us, as it also works with non-rooted devices. Unfortunately, none of the
applications using this alternative is open-source, so they could not be forked to develop our
system. However, they have been a source of inspiration in order to design the architecture of
our project (see section 3.2).
2.2 Analysis of Android Packet Capturers (Details)
In this section, we will present the packet capture applications available for Android as of February
2017. The reader can skip this part without risk of misunderstanding the project as a whole.
2.2.1 Android tcpdump
• Version: 4.9.0 / compiled with libpcap 1.8.1 (January 18, 2017)
• Download page : http://www.androidtcpdump.com/android-tcpdump/downloads [46]
• Open source : YES (BSD License)
• Needs root access: YES
• needs aditional Hardware: NO
Android tcpdump is a command line packet capture utility. It is open-source and is extremely
similar to unix’s tcpdump application. According to the documentation [46], it has to be run on
a terminal:
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• either with a terminal emulator application for Android,
• or with the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), via the adb shell command, giving you access
to a shell on your Android device from your PC.
Installation of the Android Native Development Kit (NDK) is needed.
2.2.2 SSL Packet Capture
• Version: 1.2.3 (19th October, 2015)
• By: Grey Shirts (greyduchess@gmail.com)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.greyshirts.
sslcapture [44]
• Open source : NO
• Needs root access: NO
• Presentation video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-60uuIHI2k
• Android version: 4.0+
The application uses the VPN service added in the API with Android 4.0. As of June 2017,
98.4 % of Android devices uses a version above 4.0 [7]. It is one of the most used packet
analyzer for Android because it is free (but not open-source) and does not need a rooted device.
It also allows to decrypt some SSL/TLS traffic by performing a simple man in the middle attack.
SSL Packet Capture intercepts TLS traffic and generates on the fly certificates with is own
public/private key pair firmed by its own authority. Obviously, for the certificates to be accepted
by the Android apps, the certificate of the software’s certification authority should be in the
Android device. In such a case, the SSL/TLS packets sent by the applications can be decrypted
by a man-in-the-middle proxy.
2.2.3 tPacketCapture
• Version: v2.0.1 (5th February, 2015)
• By:taosoftware
• Official website: http://www.taosoftware.co.jp/en/android/packetcapture/
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jp.co.taosoftware.
android.packetcapture [45]
• Needs root access: NO
• Open source: NO
• presentation video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjJbfYfDsX4
• Android version: 4.0+
tPacketCapture also uses the VpnService class provided by Android OS. Captured data are saved
as a PCAP file format in the external storage and can then analyzed with a PCAP reader (such
as Wireshark). A pro version is also available (9.49 e) and includes some advanced features
(such as filtering packets by applications).
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2.2.4 SimplePacketCapture
• Version: 0.0.7 (29th december, 2013)
• By: JOJOAGOGOGO (jojoa555@gmail.com)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.jojoagogogo.
simplepacketcapture [40]
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: NO
• Android version: 2.1+
This application captures the packets by directly listening to the network interface of the device.
To do this, root privileges are needed. The traffic can be saved to a PCAP file compatible with
wireshark. The log file can be sent by mail.
2.2.5 Android Packet Capture
• Version: xxx
• Last commit : 3 August, 2016
• By: yadavdev
• Google play: NO
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: YES
• GitHub: https://github.com/yadavdev/android-packet-capture [47]
Captures packet in an Android device and save them in a PCAP file (compatible with Wireshark).
It uses a precompiled tcpdump binary. It uses libsuperuser for starting an interactive root shell
from where the tcpdump binary runs.
2.2.6 Wicap. Sniffer
• Version: 1.9.1 (29, July 2016)
• By: evbadroid evbadroid@gmail.com (Russian Federation)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.evbadroid.
wicap [38]
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: NO
• Android version: 4.1+
• Presentation video: https://youtu.be/GTSWUnt-6e0
This application is also a packet capturer, with a log file that can be saved to the PCAP format.
It must be run as rooted and likely uses the libpcap library. It seems nearly as complete as
wireshark and comes with some interesting features:
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• filters (by domain, by ip, by application by protocol).
• statistics (percentage of frames with a given protocol)
• It has an interface to create ip packets and send them to a given address (e.g. ICMP
packets, HTTP packet with a given user-agent).
Demo version is free and Pro version costs 10.99 e.
2.2.7 SniffDroid
• Version: 1.4 (17th December 2013)
• By: SeriousDroid seriousdroid@gmail.com
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.serious.
sniffdroid [43]
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: NO
• Android version: 2.2+
This widget consists in a single button where the user can start/stop the capture of packets.
The output file is compatible with wireshark (.pcap format) and can be sent via mail at the end
of the capture. Surprisingly enough, it is stated in the description of the application in the Google
store that it does not use tcpdump or libcap.
2.2.8 Packet Sniffer
• Version: 1.0 (31st May 2010)
• By: Android Arts (AndroidArtsTeam@gmail.com)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=vadim.ofer.sniffer
[37]
• Official website: https://sites.google.com/site/androidarts/packet-sniffer
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: NO
• Android version: 1.6+
• Presentation Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DKNwVzOGp8
The Application is quite old and was among the very first packet sniffers on the Google play.
It must be run as root and needs the previous installation of the tcpdump package. We can
choose to save the capture inside a local database or in a local file. It can capture bluetooth
packets as well.
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2.2.9 bitShark
• Version: 0.9.08.11.2013PS (11th August, 2015)
• By: Blake Hamilton (bitshark.dev@gmail.com)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=blake.hamilton.
bitsharktrial [39]
• Needs root access: YES
• Open source: NO
• Android version: 2.3.3+
BitShark is a paid application (2.27 e), intended to be the equivalent of Wireshark on Android.
It allows real time inspection of packets. It has a .pcap viewer, so that off-line inspection is
possible as well. It even has the ability to reassemble and save web images from TCP streams.
2.3 Techniques of Packet Capturing
2.3.1 Using Libpcap
Libpcap is an API for capturing network traffic written in C and developed by the tcpdump
developers in the Network Research Group at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory since 1987 [9]. It
reads packets directly from the NIC and proposes all the low levels functions needed to inspect
them. In Unix-like operating systems, a user (or a program) must have superuser privileges to
use it [30].
We found that there are several possible ways to use this library on Android:
• By installing a precompiled tcpdump binary and then building a custom application on top
of it (since 2012, the tdpcump group provides a version of their software for Android [46])
• By running the Lil’ Debi software. Lil’ Debi is an open source application that installs a
Debian subsystem on the android device [17]. It allows to run directly on an Android phone
a large variety of debian package. For instance, it is possible to run Wireshark with this
method.
Regrettably, in both cases, the device needs to be rooted.
2.3.2 Using a VPN
While investigating the Android packet capturers, we found out that the only applications that
do not need root privileges use an implementation of the VpnService class [8] of the Android API
(added in Level 14).
A VPN is usually used to enable users to send and receive data across shared or public
networks as if their devices were directly connected to a private network. It is classically used in
the following way (figure 2.1).
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Head-office
Regional 
Office
Regional 
Office
Remote / roaming users
Internet
Figure 2.1: Classical use of a VPN service (ref. [31])
On the server of the head office is installed a VPN server. The routers of the regional offices
and each of the roaming devices implement a VPN client. The clients relay their traffic to the
server in an encrypted tunnel.
There exist various pieces of software to deploy a VPN system. Among them, we chose to
work with the openVPN software [12] because it is easy to deploy on Linux devices and there is
an open-source Android version, that we could use or embed in our application.
Concretely, the application creates a tap or a tun interface to respectively create a layer 2 or
a layer 3 VPN (see Figure 2.2). In our case, a layer 3 VPN is enough to forward IP packets.
Figure 2.2: OpenVPN tun interface (from ref. [11])
The VPN application internally knows — which application emits each packet, and to which
application the incoming packets must be forwarded.
This has a key importance insofar as it allows us to capture the network activity of each
Android application without the need of being root.
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Chapter 3
Technical Solution
In order to fulfill the project’s requirements, we have investigated various possible solutions. We
present in the chapter two possible architectures. Each solution is based on a different ruse to
capture traffic:
• the first solution is based on a WiFi access point to receive traffic (from the device to be
monitored)
• the second one is VPN-based: if a VPN client is installed on the monitored device, then
all its traffic is routed to a VPN server where it can be captured.
We will present them in sections 3.1 and 3.2 and finally compare them in section 3.3 to only
choose one of them — Solution 2.
3.1 Technical Solution 1
The first technical solution has two modes of operation:
• In the first mode, the mobile device runs the monitoring application and implements a
Wi-Fi Access Point (AP) in order to capture traffic from any connected device.
• In the second mode, the same monitoring application is installed in the monitored device
to capture its traffic and analyze its files (read and write mode). The device needs to be
rooted.
3.1.1 Mode of Operation 1: Analyze Other Devices
With this mode of operation (see Figure 3.1), the application runs on an Android device which is
inserted in the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) between the gateway and monitored device
(which is not necessarily Android). It stores the captured packets in a database and makes them
available through a web server so that they can be conveniently displayed on a large screen and
further analyzed.
In a nutshell, it behaves as a packet analyzer, such as Wireshark, for other devices.
3.1.2 Mode of Operation 2: Analyze a Rooted Device
In this case (see Figure 3.2) the application runs on the monitored device. It is endowed as
previously with a database to store packets and web server to retrieve them from a web browser.
But now, since the application is installed on a rooted device, it has access to more information,
that we are eager to retrieve such as:
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Figure 3.1: Technical solution 1 - Use case 1
Figure 3.2: Technical solution 1 - Use case 2
• the application associated to each packet,
• the read/write operations of the applications.
3.2 Technical Solution 2
After we drew inspiration from the state-of-the-art technologies, we came up with this VPN based
solution.
It is made of three components:
• an Android application implementing an OpenVPN client, that could send upon a request
from the server specific information if the device is rooted (about the file being read/written,
the application id associated to a given packet, etc.).
• a monitoring server with a static IP address implementing an VPN server that stores the
packets received through its tunnel interface in a database. A Web interface would allow
receiving instructions from a client browser and display the packets with the monitoring
information sent by the Android application
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Figure 3.3: Technical solution 2
• a web application that displays a graphical interface to — interact with the Android appli-
cation, interact with the server (e.g. start/stop recording) and see the packets received in
real time.
3.3 Comparison of the solutions
Both solutions allow to
• capture traffic without the need of being root
• read comfortably the capture on a wide screen
• provide more details about the internal state of the Android device if it is rooted
With the first solution, we can capture traffic of any device, provided that it uses Wi-Fi.
With the second solution, we can capture traffic of any Android device being able to instan-
tiate a VPN server (Android API level 14 = 98.4 % of active device as of June 2017), including
traffic from Wi-Fi and 3G/4G. Moreover, it allows to have external storage.
Table 3.1 shows how both solution respect the constraints defined in the project requirements:
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Solution 1 Wi-Fi Access Point 7 3 3 3
Solution 2 VPN Tunnel 3 3 3 3
Table 3.1: Packet capture applications for Android
We decided to implement the second solution (VPN tunnel) because it respects all the
constraints defined in the project requirements. We will present in the following chapters the
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three components of its architecture — the Android application, the monitoring server and the
client browser.
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Chapter 4
Android Application
To elaborate a first working version of our system, the Android application needs to act as a
VPN client to route all the IP traffic of the device to a server.
We did not have to develop anything, for there already exist VPN clients for Android. We
chose to work with OpenVPN for Android as it is compatible with the openVPN software, which
is widely used on Unix/Linux systems.
After a quick presentation of OpenVPN for Android in section 4.1, we will see how to setup
the VPN tunnel on both client and server sides in section 4.2.
4.1 Presentation of OpenVPN for Android
OpenVPN for Android, is a port of the OpenVPN software [12] for Android that uses the VP-
NService of Android API level 14+ (Ice Cream Sandwich) that allows to create a VPN service
without root access.
• Version: 0.6.66
• Last update : 14 June, 2017
• By: Arne Schwabe (arne-openvpn@rfc2549.org)
• Google play: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.blinkt.openvpn
[42]
• Needs root access: NO
• Android version: 4.0+
• Open source: YES (GPLv2)
• GitHub: https://github.com/schwabe/ics-openvpn [41]
4.2 Setup of the VPN Tunnel
In this section, we will detail how we configured the VPN server (subsection 4.2.1) and the VPN
client on the monitored device (subsection 4.2.2) to set up a tunnel to capture all traffic from
the client.
While it is routed through the tunnel, the traffic can not be intercepted insofar as it is
encrypted and both sides should be authenticated. We will provide more details about OpenVPN
security in subsection 4.2.3.
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4.2.1 Configuration of the OpenVPN Server
On a Debian-based server, we install the OpenVPN software from the package repository and
set the default configuration in the file /etc/openvpn/server.conf
1 $ sudo apt-get install openvpn
2 $ gunzip -c
/usr/share/doc/openvpn/examples/sample-config-files/server.conf.gz↪→
3 > /etc/openvpn/server.conf
With the default settings, the VPN server is nearly ready to use on port 1194/UDP.
Some additional settings shown in Code 4.1 allow to — redirect the client’s gateway through
the VPN (the client’s routing table will be changed) and set the client’s DNS server:
1 push "redirect-gateway def1 bypass-dhcp"
2 push "dhcp-option DNS 147.83.2.3" # dns server from the VPN server side
Code 4.1: Push Option in /etc/openvpn/server.conf
To configure the encryption of the tunnel, we fill in the security parameters:
• ”ca”: certificate file of the certification authority
• ”cert”: server’s certificates (contains the public key)
• ”key”: private key of the VPN server (should be kept secret)
• ”dh”: Diffie Hellman parameters
Additionally, the machine that runs the OpenVPN server should be configured as a router with
a source Network Address Translation (NAT). For example, in Debian-based systems, assuming
that eth0 is connected to the Internet, this can be achieved with the following (non persistent)
commands:
1 $ sudo echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
2 $ sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 10.8.0.0/8 -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
4.2.2 Configuration of the OpenVPN Client
We configure the OpenVPN client by creating a profile file (.ovpn), that must be loaded into the
Android OpenVPN application. The openvpn file contains the following parameters:
• ”ca”: certificate file of the certification authority (common with the server)
• ”cert”: client’s certificate (signed by the common certification authority)
• ”key”: client’s private key.
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4.2.3 Security of the VPN Tunnel
OpenVPN uses SSL/TLS for authentication and key exchange. As we’ve seen in subsection
4.2.1 and 4.2.2, both server and clients have certificates in order to establish a bidirectional
authentication (i.e. each side of the connection must present its own certificate) [13].
The packets that go through the tunnel are not encrypted with RSA keypairs. OpenVPN uses
precomputed Diffie Hellman (DH) parameters for encryption. The DH algorithm is better suited
for encryption because it allows recreating sessions keys much faster than RSA. The session key
is regenerated every hour (by default) [14].
4.2.4 Further Reading
Reference [26] proposes more details on how to configure the OpenVPN server.
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Chapter 5
Monitoring Server
The monitoring server is installed at the end of a VPN tunnel and receives all the traffic from
the Android device. It is composed of two elements — a packet capturer and a TCP proxy that
performs a Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks to decrypt SSL/TLS traffic.
We will detail how both of these components have been implemented on the server in section
5.2 and 5.3.
But first, in section 5.1, we will present a technology analysis of packet capturers.
5.1 Technology Analysis
As detailed in section 2.3.1 the original library to capture packets on the interface of a Unix
system is libpcap. It is written in C, but it has been ported to many languages. Most of the
libraries that we found can capture packets but also can analyze them if they support protocol
used to format the packet.
• node pcap in Node JS: has http and tcp analysis tools [34]
• pcap4j in Java: supports IP, PPP, 802.11, ARP, IPv4, ICPv4, TCP, DNS protocols [33]
• JNet pcap (packet capturer) and jNetStream (packet decoder) in Java: support more than
a hundred protocols [36]
• pypcap in Python: a wrapper for libpcap (only works as a packet capturer) [32]
• scapy in Python: a packet manipulation program with more than a hundred supported
protocols (Ethernet, IP, UDP, ICMP, UDP, ARP, DNS, ...) [35]
We decided to use Python with the Scapy library. Indeed the Python language is really
widespread in the realm of hackers. Therefore, if we ever want to add new functionalities to our
monitoring server, chances are high that we could base ourselves on an existing Python library.
It is also commonly used for web applications.
The packets must be stored in a database. We decided to use the MySQL technology,
a classic, with a connector available in Python 2 and 3. Sure enough, they are many other
database systems compatible with Python that might have been equally satisfactory.
5.2 Packet Capturer
The basic functionality of the monitoring server is to capture packets and store them in a database.
For this purpose, we used the Scapy library [20] and then the Scapy3k library [16] when updating
our project for Python 3.
Chapter 5. Monitoring Server 33
5.2.1 Presentation of Scapy
Scapy is a packet manipulation program. It enables the user to capture, analyze, forge and send
network packets [19].
Its main asset is its ability to send packets and receive the corresponding response. It behaves
as follows:
1. Packet creation: With Scapy, it is easy to create any kind of packet, without having to
respect the protocols. Creating unconventional packets is specially interesting for hackers.
The example 5.1 shows how to create and ICMP packet with padding (not payload)
2. Packet transmission: Scapy sends the packet
3. Packet response: Scapy returns a list of packet couples (request, answer) and a list of
unmatched packets. This is the task of the sr (send/receive) command. Below is an
example of sr1, an alternative to the sr command that only returns one response packet.
1 # sudo scapy
2 Welcome to Scapy (3.0.0)
3 >>> p=sr1(IP(dst="upc.es")/ICMP()/"XXXXXXXXXXX")
4 Begin emission:
5 .Finished to send 1 packets.
6 *
7 Received 2 packets, got 1 answers, remaining 0 packets
8 >>> p
9 <IP version=4 ihl=5 tos=0x0 len=39 id=3387 flags=DF frag=0 ttl=251
proto=icmp chksum=0xe6ff src=147.83.2.135 dst=10.192.235.0 options=[]
|<ICMP type=echo-reply code=0 chksum=0xee45 id=0x0 seq=0x0 |<Raw
load='XXXXXXXXXXX' |>>>
↪→
↪→
↪→
Code 5.1: Command-line example of the Scapy sr1 method (from ref. [19])
As we can see, scapy has some advanced features, most of which were not used in this project.
To implement our packet capturer, we rather used the basic sniff method introduced in the next
section 5.2.2.
5.2.2 Sniffing
The core of our capture program lies in the following 2 pieces of code.
• In Code 5.2, we start the session by calling the sniff method of the Scapy API with 2
arguments — iface: the interface to be monitored and prn: the callback triggered for each
packet received on the interface.
• In Code 5.3 we define the actions to be performed for each packet — store the packet into
database and add the packet to the conversations (conversations are detailed in section
5.2.3).
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1 def threaded_sniff(session, db):
2 ...
3 #if="tun0"
4 scapy.sendrecv.sniff(iface=if, prn=session_callback(db))
5 ...
Code 5.2: Function to start the packet capture (in file mono/mono session.py)
1 def session_callback(db):
2 def callback(packet):
3 if (is_session_active() and get_run_order()):
4 id_packet = mono_packet.packet_into_db(packet, id_sess, db)
5 mono_conv.add_packet_to_conversations(id_packet, packet, db, id_sess)
6 return callback
Code 5.3: Callback function on packet reception (in file mono/mono session.py)
5.2.3 Conversations
A conversation is a summary of the packets exchanged between two endpoints. We define
three types of conversations: IPV4 conversation, TCP conversations and UDP conversations. It
contains the following information:
• IPA, IPB : IPV4 addresses of endpoints
• Bytes = BytesA→B +BytesB→A : Cumulated size of the IP payloads
• Packets = PacketsA→B + PacketsB→A: Number of packets exchanged between the 2
endpoints
• Duration: Time (in s) elapsed between the first and the last packet recorded
• Relative start: Time (in s) elapsed between the start of the session and the first packet of
the conversation recorded
For TCP and UDP conversations, there are two additional fields: PortA and PortB.
Figure 5.1, shows the summary of all the IP conversations during a session.
Without revealing too many boring implementation details, we confess that conversations are
stored in a table of the MySQL database. They are associated to a line in one of the tables
CONVERSATION IPV4, CONVERSATION UDP and CONVERSATION TCP with a given id.
5.2.4 Code Structure and Unit Testing
The library we developed to implement the functionalities of the monitoring server is called Mono.
The functions defined in this library typically interacts with the database or with the Scapy library.
They are thematically organized in files (e.g. mono/session.py, mono packet.py, ...) and tested
within small scenarios in test files (mono/test/test session.py, mono/test/test packet.py).
Let us take the example of the function get or create conv(...) to retrieve a conversation
from the database. It is defined in file mono conversation.py (see Code 5.4).
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Figure 5.1: GUI of the IPV4 conversations
Let IPsrc and IPdst be respectively the source and destination ip of the packet; and IPa
and IPb, the IP endpoints of the conversation. An IP conversation matches the packet if:
IPa = IPsrc and IPb = IPdst
or
IPa = IPdst and IPb = IPsrc
A small scenario is written in file test conversation.py (see Code 5.5) to verify that this rule
is respected in two cases:
• When the function get or create conv(...) is called with the same packet, it should return
the same conversation (with the same id).
• If we invert the source and destination IP of the packet, the function must also return the
same conversation.
1 #returns a dictionary of the conversation associated to the given packet.
2 def get_or_create_conv(packet, db, conv_type, id_session):
3 #complex functions that ends up making an SQL request to the database
4 ...
Code 5.4: get or create conv(...) (from file mono/mono conversation.py)
Having automated unit tests was a valuable help to spot regression issues while migrating
the code from Python 2 to Python 3.
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1 class ConversationsTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
2 def test_add_conv_ipv4(self):
3 #setup: connect to datatbase
4 db = connect(...)
5 #test 1: call get_or_create_conv twice with the same packet
6 # (it should return the same conversation)
7 packet1 = mono_packet.create_ping_packet(...)
8 conv1 = mono_conv.get_or_create_conv(packet1, db, 0, 0)
9 conv2 = mono_conv.get_or_create_conv(packet1, db, 0, 0)
10 self.assertEqual(conv1["id_conversation"], conv2["id_conversation"])
11 #test 2: swap src_ip and dest_ip and call get_or_create_conv
12 # (it should still return the same conversation)
13 src = packet1.getlayer(IP).src
14 packet1.getlayer(IP).src = packet1.getlayer(IP).dst
15 packet1.getlayer(IP).dst = src
16 conv3 = mono_conv.get_or_create_conv(packet1, db, 0, 0)
17 self.assertEqual(conv1["id_conversation"], conv3["id_conversation"])
18 ...
Code 5.5: Unit test (in file mono/test/test conversation.py)
5.3 SSL/TLS Traffic Decoder
5.3.1 Presentation of mitmproxy
To decrypt SSL/TLS traffic, we decided to use the Python 3 program mitmproxy. It is defined
in the Kali package repository as “an SSL-capable man-in-the-middle HTTP proxy. It provides a
console interface that allows traffic flows to be inspected and edited on the fly” [3].
Mitmproxy is a TCP and HTTP/HTTPS proxy. “It pretends to be the server to the client,
and pretends to be the client to the server” [1].
As most traffic on the Internet does not require the client to be authenticated, the traffic
from the server is not encrypted.
To decrypt the traffic from the client, mitmproxy masquerades as the server by sending a
fraudulent certificate to the client firmed by its own certification authority, containing its own
public key (for which he has the corresponding private key), with the corresponding Common
Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Names (SANs).
The major trick is to retrieve the CN and SANs that change according to the IP address or
the domain name, which is sent via the Server Name Indication (SNI) protocol. To do this, they
must first receive the server’s certificate that contains all these details before sending their own.
As a consequence, the initialization of a connection is performed in 3 steps: 1) start of the
TLS handshake with the client until the SNI is received (if any); 2) TLS handshake with the
server with the accurate ip address or domain name; 3) end of the TLS handshake with the client
(with the accurate CN and SANs).
As pictured in Figure 5.2, the steps of this process are the following:
1. The clients connects to the server
2. mitmproxy intercepts the request and sends back a 200: Connection established to the
client
3. The client then initiates the TLS handshake with the SNI (if any)
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4. mitmproxy pauses the TLS negociation with the client and ask the server’s certificate
because it has now all the elements to do so.
5. mitmproxy completes the TLS handshake with the server and retrieves its certificate. It can
now forge its fake certificate with the correct CN and SANS fields of the server’s certificate
6. The fake certificate is sent to the client
7. The conversation can now begin
Figure 5.2: How mitmproxy works (from http://docs.mitmproxy.org [1])
Mitmproxy has four modes of operation:
1. In regular mode, the client application must be configured to use an HTTP proxy. (for
example in a Firefox browser in Preferences → Network → Proxy set the IP and port of
the HTTP proxy). Traffic is redirected to the proxy at the HTTP layer
2. In transparent mode, no client configuration is required, IP packets are emitted by the
client as if there were no proxy. Mitmproxy is installed in a router that sees all the traffic
from the client. Traffic is redirected to the server at the TCP layer.
3. In reverse proxy mode, mitmproxy receives requests from the internet and forward them
to another server.
4. In upstream proxy mode, mitmproxy can be configured to forward all its traffic to another
HTTP proxy.
The transparent mode is the best adapted to our situation.
5.3.2 Implementation of the Traffic Decoder
To integrate mitmproxy in our server program, we use the mitmproxy scripting capability whereby
a callback function can be called for specific events: reception of a TCP packet, of an HTTP
request, of an HTTP response [2]. In our case, we are interested to work at the TCP layer
in order to decode as much traffic as possible. To do this, we define the tcp message(flow)
callback (see Code 5.6). Each time this function is called, it means that a new TCP packet
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has been received. We then simply retrieve the information of this packet and place it in the
database.
1 def tcp_message(flow):
2 #get last_message of the flow
3 lm = flow.messages[-1]
4 ...
5 #retrieve flow information: ip and ports of endpoints
6 ip_server = flow.server_conn.address.host
7 ip_client = flow.client_conn.address.host
8 port_server = flow.server_conn.address.port
9 port_client = flow.client_conn.address.port
10 #packet summary: ips, ports and payload
11 m= { "from_client": lm.from_client,
12 "packet_length": len(lm.content),
13 "ip_src": ip_client if lm.from_client else ip_server,
14 "ip_dst": ip_server if lm.from_client else ip_client,
15 "port_src": port_client if lm.from_client else port_server,
16 "port_dst": port_server if lm.from_client else port_client,
17 "payload": lm.content, ...
18 }
19 #add tcp decrypted packet to database
20 (id_packet, packet) = mono_mitm.mitm_into_db(m, current_id_session, db)
21 ...
Code 5.6: Definition of the tcp message(flow) function in file mitm.py
This code is interpreted only if the mitmproxy process is active which is started and stopped
from our web interface (presented in chapter 6). We use the following method (Code 5.7) to
launch it in three steps:
• redirect the traffic from the VPN tunnel to the port that mitmproxy will be listening to
(8182) with the iptables command
• parametrize mitmproxy with the appropriate options — cadir: directory containing the
certificates; listen port: traffic must be forwarded to this port; mode: transparent (se-
lected among the 4 proxy modes regular, transparent, reverse, upstream); rawtcp: True
to enable the TCP proxy (every tcp packet will be intercepted); scripts: path to where
the tcp message(flow) callback is defined; ssl insecure: set to True to continue the up-
stream SSL handshake even if the server’s certificate is invalid; ssl version client and
ssl version server: set to all to support all the versions of SSL/TLS (downstream and
upstream); tcp hosts: set to [’.*’] to intercept all TCP traffic.
• start the mitmproxy program
5.3.3 Limitations of the Traffic Decoder
There are situations where the traffic decoder does not work:
• With a custom encryption scheme (not TLS/SSL).
• When the transport protocol is not TCP (for instance TLS over UDP).
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1 def start_mitm():
2 ...
3 global mitm_master
4 #add iptable rule
5 os.system("iptables -A PREROUTING -t nat -s 10.8.0.0/24 -p tcp -j
REDIRECT --to-ports 8182")↪→
6 ...
7 #set mitmproxy options
8 dump_options = options.Options()
9 dump_options.merge(
10 dict(
11 cadir = '˜/.mitmproxy',
12 listen_port = 8182,
13 mode = 'transparent',
14 rawtcp = True,
15 scripts = ['mitm.py'],
16 ssl_insecure = True,
17 ssl_version_client = 'all',
18 ssl_version_server = 'all',
19 tcp_hosts = ['.*'],
20 )
21 )
22 #start mitm process
23 server = process_options(dump_options)
24 mitm_master = dump.DumpMaster(dump_options, server)
25 mitm_master.run()
Code 5.7: Definition of the start mitm() function in file mono/mono mitm.py
• When an application uses a client certificate.
• With certificate pinning: the operation of pinning consists in associating a host with their
expected x509 certificate, public key or certification hierarchy [15]. If these properties
change, the client will not trust the certificate.
• With HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP): an extension of the HTTP protocol where a
server can inform the client of a list of public key hashes associated to period of time
during which they are valid [28]. Only the public keys corresponding to the hashes can be
used afterwards by the server.
In those cases, any attempt to use mitmproxy will result in a TLS handshake failure which
will disrupt the normal traffic of the Android device and prevent the applications to do what they
are programmed to do. This is a major problem when trying to analyze them.
However, it is still possible to program mitmproxy to stop intercepting traffic to specific
domains as long as they are known in advance.
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Chapter 6
Web Application
The web application is the major component of the Mono project.
Is uses a Python Web framework (Flask) and a client-side JavaScript framework (Angular JS).
Both of these elements will be introduced in section 6.1.
In section 6.2, we will present with more details the Angular JS Framework, so that the reader
gets used to its design.
In section 6.3 we will expose the architecture of this web application.
To better understand this architecture, and how components relate one with another, we will
introduce the dataflow in section 6.4 and see how a simple user action is handled by the system.
Finally, we will see the packet display mechanism together with the DataTable JavaScript
library in section 6.5.
6.1 Presentation
In subsection 6.1.1, we detail the main tools with which we’ve built this Web interface — Flask:
a Python Web server and Angular JS: a JavaScript application framework. We will explain why
we chose them
Subsection 6.1.2 unveils the look of the Web interface.
6.1.1 Technology Analysis
The Web server uses the same technology (i.e. the Python language with a MySQL database)
as the monitoring server (presented in chapter 5). This way, we can have a unique application
on the server which is more maintainable.
Among all the Python web frameworks [18], we distinguish two categories:
• Full-Stack Frameworks: They provide all the elements needed for a Web application
(an HTTP server, a storage mechanism such as a database, a template engine, a request
dispatcher, an authentication module and an AJAX toolkit). Django is the most famous
of them.
• Non Full-Stack Frameworks: They only provide some of the previously cited features
with always a base ”application server”. The most widely used is Flask.
We have decided to use Flask (0.12.2 Released 2017-05-16) described by its developers
[25] as “a microframework for Python based on Werkzeug, Jinja 2 and good intentions”. We
chose it because it includes the two elements that we need for our web application — a built-in
development server and a request dispatcher. According to the documentation [24], the built-
in server is “not suitable for production as it doesn’t scale well and by default serves only one
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request at a time”. This does not matter to us, as only one user is supposed to be using the web
application at a time.
On the client side, we have decided to use the Angular JS web application framework, be-
cause its capacity to reduce development time needs no further proof. What has been specially
interesting to us is its aptitude to automatically bind JavaScript variables with HTML elements.
Of course, many other JavaScript libraries would have been equally satisfactory. Section 6.2
describes with more details this framework.
6.1.2 User Interface
Figure 6.1 shows a capture of the Web interface. On the left hand side is the list of all session
with a form to create a new one. On the right hand side we can see:
• at the top: the session’s details (name, date of creation and monitored interface) with the
main controls — start/stop recording, start/stop MITM (decrypting traffic with a Man In
The Middle attack)
• at the bottom: various tabs, each displaying a list of packets (all packets, packets captured
with the MITM attack, packets specific to a conversation) or a list of conversations (IP,
UDP, TCP)
Figure 6.1: Web user interface
6.2 Angular JS
Angular JS is a client-side JavaScript framework. It is intended to be used for dynamic web
applications.
With Angular JS, the page is not written in pure HTML, but with a specific template language,
that is compiled when the page is rendered. This template language allows writing specific
directives in the HTML code, to bind HTML objects to JavaScript objects, or GUI events to
JavaScript methods, with little lines of code.
The official introduction to Angular JS [5], gives some examples of the essential elements
that are needed when writing a web application and that angular JS provide with its templating
language:
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• Data-binding
• DOM manipulation
• DOM event handling
• Grouping of HTML into reusable components
They are explained in the following examples.
Data binding:
1 <input ng-model="name">
2 <div> {{name}} </div>
In this example the ng-model directive allows to change the content of the JavaScript vari-
able “name” from the HTML input. And the {{name}} directive, displays the content of this
JavaScript variable. This is called 2-way binding, as the HTML can be updated by the JavaScript
and vice-versa.
DOM manipulation:
With the ng-repeat directive, we can easily repeat DOM fragments.
1 <ul> <li ng-repeat="x in names"> {{ x }} </li> </ul>
With the ng-show directive, it is also possible to hide/show DOM elements upon a specific
condition:
1 <div ng-show="a"> <!-- Showed if 'a' is true--> </div>
DOM event handling:
Directly from the HTML, it is possible to attach new behavior to DOM elements. For
instance in the following example the method myFunction() will be called when the button is
clicked, thanks to the ng-click directive.
1 <button ng-click="myFunction()">Click me</button>
Grouping of HTML into reusable components:
It is possible to include HTML content using the ng-include directive
1 <div ng-include="'myFile.html'"></div>
6.3 Application Architecture
After the first weeks dedicated to elaborating a proof of concept, we expanded our prototype
with a few features (pagination, server side processing, conversations). As a consequence, the
number of lines of code started growing and it was time to redesign our client architecture.
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Figure 6.2: Data Flow of our client-side application
Figure 6.2 represents the key components of our application and how they relate within the
data-flow. Most of these components are standard elements of the Angular JS library and we
will briefly detail their roles below.
6.3.1 View and Controller
The view is written in HTML with some Angular JS directives. Each view is related to a controller.
We declare the view at the same time as the controller in the HTML:
1 <body ng-app="monoApp">
2 <div ng-controller="monoController as mono">
3 <!-- The HTML inside is controlled by the monoController -->
4 <!--We display the content of $scope.greeting -->
5 {{greeting}} <!-- prints ¡Hola Guapo! -->
6 </div>
7 </body>
Code 6.1: index.html
In the Javascript file, we define the controller in the following way:
1 var monoApp = angular.module("monoApp", []);
2 monoApp.controller("monoController",['$scope', function($scope){
3 var self = this;
4 $scope.greeting = '¡Hola guapo!'
5 }]);
Code 6.2: app.js
A Controller contains only the logic needed for a single view. They are meant to handle user
actions. If these actions entail more complex algorithms, they must not do the job themselves,
but rely on third-parties. In order to keep them slim, which is good practice, it is advisable to
use services (see section 6.3.3).
Controllers communicate with their corresponding views via the scope object.
Chapter 6. Web Application 44
6.3.2 Scope
The scope is, “the glue between application controller and the view” [6]. Both controllers and
directives have reference to the scope, but not to each other. The controller is therefore view
agnostic and can be tested on its own, without the need of a view.
It is advised to consider the scope as read-only in templates and write-only in controllers [10].
We tried to follow this rule in our design.
Scopes are not the model but have reference to it. They gather the data, that are mutually
shared by the view and the controller.
When a view is embedded in another one, the scope from the child view inherits from the
scope of the parent view. Scopes inherit prototypically; it means that the child object can access
all the properties and methods from the parent object, but if a property in the child object is
changed, it won’t affect the parent object.
6.3.3 Services
In Angular JS, a service is a function, or object, that is available for an Angular JS application.
In our application, the API we use to communicate with the server is stored in various services.
For instance, we declare our Session API with a service in the following way:
1 angular.module("monoApp").service('Session', [ 'Model', function(Model) {
2 //here we store our API to communicate with the server
3 this.addSession = function(){...};
4 }]);
Code 6.3: excerpt of the file Session.js
It is now available for use in a controller, provided it is declared in its dependencies :
1 monoApp.controller("monoController", ['$scope', 'Session',
function($scope, Session) {↪→
2
3 this.addSession = function(){ //triggered by user action
4 Session.addSession( ... ); //call to the Session API
5 };
Code 6.4: Use of the Session service in a controller (app.js)
6.3.4 The Model
Models represent the knowledge, the data presented to the user to interact with. In our archi-
tecture, the data are gathered inside the server database. The data needed by the application
are downloaded from the server and kept inside a “proxy” model, which is a single object. It is
the task of our API functions to keep this client-side model synchronized with the database.
Besides, the controller that want to be informed of the evolution of a variable, need to
subscribe to the model. When the model will update a variable, it will fire this event to all
controllers (see arrow 6 of figure 6.2).
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6.4 Dataflow
We present thereafter an example of how the user interacts with the database to change the
name of the current session. In order to illustrate our dataflow, we will follow the eight steps
of figure 6.2. Let us start from the GUI. When the user wants to change the current session’s
name, he simply clicks on it to open a pop-up input as illustrated on figures 6.3 and 6.4.
Figure 6.3: Session information Figure 6.4: Change session information
Step 1:
After confirming the new session name
by clicking on the blue tick-button,
the view triggers the controller method
mono.updateName(), thanks to the
onaftersave attribute.
1 <div class="col-md-6">
2 Session:
3 <a href="#" editable-text="mono.newName" onaftersave="mono.updateName()">
4 {{ current_session.name || "" }}
5 </a>
6 </div>
Code 6.5: excerpt of the file session-top.html
Step 2:
The controller’s method presented below clones the cur-
rent session object and changes its name attribute. The
GUI is not updated yet, because we have to perform the
modification on the database first. This is the purpose
of the method updateCurrentSession() of the ’Session’
API.
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1 this.updateName = function(){
2 var sess_clone = angular.extend({}, $scope.current_session);
3 sess_clone.name = self.newName;
4 Session.updateCurrentSession(sess_clone);
5 };
Code 6.6: updateName method in the monoController (app.js)
Step 3 and 5:
The Session API (an angular JS service), is in charge
of contacting the server to request the modification of
the session via an AJAX call. Only when the server
has confirmed that the session has been modified, the
(proxy)Model can be updated by calling the method
Model.setCurrentSession() on line 15
1 //updates any session
2 this.updateSession = function(sess, cb){
3 $http.post('/awebservice',{method:"update_session",params:
4 {session: sess},}
5 ).then(function(response) {
6 sess = response.data.session;
7 if (cb instanceof Function) cb.call(sess, sess);
8 }, function(error) {console.log(error);});
9 };
10
11 //updates the current session
12 this.updateCurrentSession = function(sess, cb){
13 this.updateSession(sess, function(rec_sess){
14 new_curr_sess = rec_sess || Model.getCurrentSession();
15 Model.setCurrentSession(new_curr_sess); //
16 if (cb instanceof Function) cb.call();
17 })
18 };
Code 6.7: Definition of Session.updateCurrentSession method (Session.js)
Step 4:
The server is in charge of updating the database and
sending the modified session to the client.
At the server side, the first function called is the
web service and acts as a dispatcher, to call the right
Chapter 6. Web Application 47
function in the server’s API for each request. Each request is identified by its ’method’ parameter.
Here the ’method’ update session, triggers a call to the mono session.update session() (line 8)
in the mono session.py file. Once the session has been modified in database, we reply by sending
it back to the client.
1 @app.route("/awebservice", methods=['GET','POST'])
2 def awebservice():
3 try:
4 ...
5 elif (method == 'update_session'):
6 print 'update session'
7 sess = params["session"]
8 mono_session.update_session(sess, db2) #
9 return jsonify(session =
mono_session.get_session(sess["id_session"],db2))↪→
Code 6.8: Method update session in the server webservice (server.py)
Code 6.9, shows the SQL query executed by the server when updating a session.
1 def update_session(session, db):
2 try:
3 sql = "UPDATE SESSIONS SET name = %s, iface = %s, date = %s WHERE
id_session = %s"↪→
4 params = (session["name"], session["iface"],session['date'],
int(session['id_session']) )↪→
5 db.cursor().execute(sql, params) #safe sql querry
6 db.commit()
7 except Exception as e:
8 ...
Code 6.9: SQL query executed by the server (mono session.py)
Step 6:
Once the Session Service has received the answer
from the server, the (proxyModel) is updated
by calling the Model.setCurrentSession()
method (detailed below) which, in turn, triggers
an event to inform all the controllers (listeners
of this event).
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1 this.setCurrentSession = function(new_curr_session){
2 this.current_session = new_curr_session;
3 $rootScope.$broadcast('Model::currentSessionUpdate',
this.current_session);↪→
4 };
Code 6.10: The model is updated and fires an event (Model.js)
Step 7:
When the main controller receives the event that
the Model has changed, a callback function is called
to update its attributes.
1 $scope.$on('Model::currentSessionUpdate', function(event, curr){
2 //automatically updates the HTML
3 $scope.current_session = curr;
4 //re-initialize forms
5 self.newIface = $scope.current_session.iface;
6 self.newName = $scope.current_session.name;
7 //update current session's name in sessions' list
8 var res = $scope.sessions.find(function(element){
9 return element.id_session == curr.id_session;
10 });
11 angular.extend(res, curr);
12 });
Code 6.11: The event Model::currentSessionUpdate is received(app.js)
Step 8:
When a controller modifies the attributes of the ’$scope’, they are automatically changed in the
HTML code by the Angular JS library (2 way binding property).
6.5 Packet Display
One of the main task of the Mono Web application is to display the traffic captured during a
session or being recorded while a session is active. In this latter case, the graphical interface
should be regularly updated.
We cannot simply display all the packets on a Web page, as it would slow navigation down
or eventually freeze the browser page. Therefore we have to use pagination.
In subsection 6.5.1, we will see the possible ways to perform pagination (with Local Storage
or server side processing) and choose one among them (server side processing).
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In subsection 6.5.2, we will present a way to implement server side processing with Datatables,
a JavaScript library.
6.5.1 How to paginate:
To avoid running low on memory, we have to implement pagination, with one of the following
scenarios:
• use the Local Storage of the Javascript engine to store all the packets’ information and
display only a small amount of them in a page on the browser.
• use server side processing, whereby all the packets are stored remotely (in the webserver
datatabse), and their content is retrieved each time it has to be displayed in a page.
Although, the second option can be considered as less efficient, because it consumes more band-
width (an Ajax request must be sent for each user action), it overcomes the memory limit problem
of the Local Storage (5 MB max). This is why we have decided to choose this solution.
It is usually the rule in web design to unburden the server, and give as much work load as possible
to the client, but since in our case, there can only be one client for one server, we rely on the
server storage and its computing capabilities.
6.5.2 Datatables
In this subsection, we present the DataTables library and then give a more thorough explanation
of how it performs server-side processing.
Presentation
DataTables is a JavaScript library (a jQuery plugin) to deal with dynamic tables in HTML[21]. It
is licensed under the MIT license and endowed with some features that are specially interesting
to us:
• pagination,
• instant search
• multi-column ordering
To perform these actions, DataTables has two different modes:
• Client-side processing: the data to be displayed is given once to the DataTables constructor
and then data-processing is performed with JavaScript in the browser.
• Server-side processing: “an Ajax request is made for every table redraw, with only the data
required for each display returned” [21]. Data-processing is performed by the server.
Figure 6.5 shows the default display of an HTML table made with DataTables.
Server side processing
The data that are displayed on the client screen are directly connected to the content of a table
in a database. This is of major interest when the data are constantly updated on the server side
(while recording packets) and when there is a great amount of data that cannot be displayed at
the same time.
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Figure 6.5: GUI of the Datatable JS library
On each user action, the Datatable JS library sends to the server an AJAX request with the
following list of parameters in Javascript Object Notation (JSON) format:
1 {
2 "draw": 1,
3 "columns": [
4 {
5 "data": "id_packet",
6 "name": "ID packet",
7 "searchable": true,
8 "orderable": true,
9 "search": {"value": "", "regex": false}
10 },
11 {"data": "ip_src",...},
12 {"data": "ip_dst",...},
13 ],
14 "order": [{"column": 0, "dir": "asc"}],
15 "start": 0,
16 "length": 10,
17 "search": {
18 "value": "",
19 "regex": false
20 },
21 "method": "datatatables_packets",
22 "id_session": 94,
23 "params": {}
24 }
Code 6.12: Example of a JSON query from datatables.js
We specify:
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• columns: each column of the database table we want to display (id packet, ip src, ip dst,
etc.).
• order: the column according to wich the data must be sorted (here we sort according to
the first column, in the ’asc’ direction).
• start and length: start point of the data set, and number of records to display.
• search: specify if the user has entered a search string. The search will be carried out server
side in all columns that have the searchable parameter set to true.
• The other parameters (”method”, ”id session”, ”params”) have been added by us to
select the desired SQL table and session.
To process this query on the server side, we used a script from the datatables.net website [22]
(Python + CGI + MySQL) and adapted it to our software stack model (Python + Flask +
MySQL).
The purpose of the server-side script is to translate the Datatables parameters into a MySQL
query to fetch the desired table rows.
The JSON parameters in Code 6.12, will be translated to the following MySQL query
(Code 6.13):
1 SELECT SQL_CALC_FOUND_ROWS id_packet, ip_src, ip_dst, ...
2 FROM PACKETS
3 WHERE id_session = 94
4 ORDER BY id_conversation_ipv4 asc
5 LIMIT 0, 10
Code 6.13: Translation of the JSON parameters to MySQL query
When a search string is entered, we look for a match in all columns. The following Code 6.14,
shows the MySQL query with search[”value”]=’TCP’.
1 SELECT SQL_CALC_FOUND_ROWS id_packet, ip_src, ip_dst, ...
2 FROM PACKETS
3 WHERE id_session = 94 AND ( id_packet LIKE '%TCP%' OR ip_src LIKE '%TCP%'
OR l4_proto LIKE '%TCP%')↪→
4 ORDER BY id_packet asc
5 LIMIT 0, 10
Code 6.14: MySQL query with string search
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Chapter 7
Security Concerns
In the design of a Network security tool, as in any software design, it never hurts to evoke security
threats together with their possible countermeasures.
In section 7.1, we will present a list of measures that have been taken to guarantee the
safety of the development environment, that must also be applied to production environments.
In section 7.2, we will focus on the specific issue of SQL injection and see what measures have
been taken to circumvent it.
7.1 Security Issues
As a packet capturer, Mono needs to inspect all traffic of an interface and uses the libpcap
library (which requires high privileges). As a transparent decrypting proxy, it needs to forward all
traffic of an interface to a given port with the iptables command (which requires root privileges).
Consequently, the Mono program is run as root. If a hacker were capable to take control of the
program, he might be able to execute commands with the same right as of the program, which
would compromise the entire system.
During the elaboration of the project, we tried our best to protect the system with the
following set of security measures:
• Use https to avoid eavesdropping: the Mono Web application can be configured to use
HTTPS. We used TLS certificates firmed by the letsencrypt authority [4].
• Place the server behind a reverse proxy with a strong firewall policy and port forwarding.
• Secure the system against SQL injections: we detail this point in next section 7.2.
We also can think of other measures, that we did not have a chance to implement, that are
desirable in the future.
• Set up a user system, so that only authenticated users can access the interface.
• Only allow connections from a given location.
7.2 Protecting Aagainst SQL Injection
In order to implement the server-side processing of the DataTables JavaScript plugin, we based
ourselves on a existing piece of program [22], proposed on the official DataTatables website.
It turns out that this script is sensitive to SQL injection, because it trusts JSON parameters
that come from the client, without checking that they do not contain malicious SQL code.
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Every attribute of the JSON query made by the DataTables library (Code 6.12) can be
modified by a user. These inputs must be sanitized.
We will present two ways of sanitizing user inputs — with argument escaping (subsection
7.2.1) and with withelisting (subsection 7.2.2).
7.2.1 Argument Escaping
The server program uses the MySQLdb python library. The easiest way protect the SQL queries
is to trust the execute(self, query, args) method of the cursor.MySQLCursor class.
In the following example (code 7.1), if the parameters come from user inputs, their potential
malicious content will be neutralized with the ”.cursor.execute()” method.
1 #open connection to MySQL server
2 import MySQLdb
3 from flask import request
4 db = MySQLdb.connect(host='localhost',user='', password='', db='')
5 cursor = db.cursor()
6 #retrieve id_packet from user input
7 id_packet = request.get_json()["id_packet"]
8 #execute query
9 sql = "SELECT * FROM packets WHERE id_packet = %s"
10 cur.execute(sql, (id_packet,)) #user input is escaped
11 rows = cursor.fetchall()
Code 7.1: Parameters are escaped with the execute method
On the other hand, the following code 7.2 is vulnerable to SQL injections because it performs
direct string substitution with the % operator:
1 #retrieve id_packet from user input
2 id_packet = request.get_json()["id_packet"]
3 #execute query
4 sql = "SELECT * FROM packets WHERE id_packet = %s or id = %s"
5 cur.execute(sql%(id_packet)) #this is BAD
6 rows = cursor.fetchall()
Code 7.2: Erroneous use of the cursor.execute() method
Injection based on 1=1
Let us examine how vulnerable boths codes are vulnerables to SQL injections and assume that
an attacker tries an injection by changing the id packet parameter:
1 id_packet = "3400 OR 1=1"
If we don’t use the cursor.execute() method correctly (Code 7.2), the server executes the
following query:
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1 SELECT * FROM PACKETS WHERE id_packet = 3400 OR 1=1
All lines of the table will be returned (the code is injectable).
On the other hand, if the cursor.execute() method is used correctly (Code 7.1), the following
query will be executed:
1 SELECT * FROM PACKETS WHERE id_packet = '3400 OR 1=1'
The injection does not work because parameters are quoted. The MySQL engine will succeed
to convert the string ’3400 OR 1=1’ to the integer 3400 and return only one row (the code is
not injectable).
If we notice that the the user input has been quoted, we might try to trick the MySQL engine,
by closing the quote inside the user input string:
1 id_packet = "3400' OR 1=1; --"
The injection will not work with Code 7.1 because strings are escaped. So the following
query will be passed to the MySQL engine:
1 SELECT * FROM PACKETS WHERE id_packet = '3400\' OR 1=1; --'
Here again, the string ’3400 \’ OR 1=1; –’ will be successfully converted to the integer 3400
and only one row will be returned.
Injection based on batched SQL Statements
The method cursor.execute() is designed to take only one statement, because it makes no
guarantees about the state of the cursor afterward.Therefore, injections based on batched SQL
statements are not possible.
For instance if we supplied the input:
1 id_packet = "3400; DROP TABLE PACKETS; --"
the program will have tried to execute the query:
1 SELECT * FROM PACKETS WHERE id_packet = 3400; DROP TABLE PACKETS
and an error would have been thrown (“Commands out of sync; you can’t run this command
now”).
7.2.2 Whitelisting
With the python method cursor.execute(), not all strings can be escaped. This is the case
when we have dynamical tables and columns names, for instance when we use the datatables
Javascript plugin in ”server-side-processing” mode (see Code 6.12).
For example, the following code will not work:
1 cols = ["id_packet", "ip_src", "ip_dst"] #from user input
2 query = "SELECT %s, %s, %s FROM PACKETS WHERE"
3 params = (cols[0], cols[1], cols[2])
4 cursor.execute(query, params)
5 rows = cursor.fetchall()
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This is because the columns names will be interpreted as strings. The following query will be
passed to the MySQL engine ()and it does not return the desired data):
1 SELECT 'id_packet', 'ip_src', 'ip_dest' FROM PACKETS
In this situation, we won’t any other choice but to use string concatenation, but in order to
avoid injections, the users input must be checked against a whitelist:
1 cols_input = ["id_packet", "ip_src", "ip_dst"] #from user input
2 cols = whitelist(cols_input) # comparison with allowed strings
3 query="SELECT %s FROM PACKETS" %(', '.join(cols),)
4 cursor.execute(query)
5 rows = cursor.fetchall()
Code 7.3: Safe SQL query where column names are whitelisted
In Code 7.3, we protect the SQL query by whitelisting the column names. The function used
(whitelist(cols input)) should try to match the inputs, with the list of actual column names.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Developments
We have presented in this report the Mono project, a monitoring system for mobile applications
to carry out network forensics investigations.
We laid the cornerstone of this solution by implementing a VPN-based web packet capturer
available at https://github.com/gcanal/Mono.
Let us enumerate the current capabilities of the Mono application:
1. Manage session: Mono can deal with various sessions (a set of packets recorded during
certain period). It is possible to create and remove a session as well as exploring its recorded
packets. From the Web interface, it is possible to change its properties — name, listening
interface (but not while it is active). Only one session can be active at the same time.
2. Capture packet: From the interface, we can launch the Scapy capture process on the
selected interface. Received packets are placed in a MySQL database.
3. Decrypt SSL/TLS traffic: Also with a single click, we can launch the mitmproxy pro-
cess. All traffic from the selected interface, will be redirected to the mitmproxy listening
port and decrypted if possible (section 5.3.3 details the limitations of the traffic decoder).
The certificate of the mitmproxy’s certification authority should first be installed in the
monitored device.
4. Explore conversations: When a packet is received, it is added to a conversation, whose
number of received and bytes are incremented. Even while the traffic is being captured, it
is possible to list all IP, UDP and TCP conversations and see their associated packets.
5. Paginate: After having adapted the DataTables JavaScript library to our project architec-
ture, the list of packets is directly read from the database, which is automatically divided
into pages of adjustable length (10, 20, 50, 100). The list can be ordered according to any
column.
6. Select and download packets and conversations: It is possible to select individually or
collectively packets and conversations. For instance, it is possible to select:
• all packets of a given UDP conversation,
• all packets in the session,
• a given TCP conversation,
• all TCP conversations.
Once conversations and packets are selected, it is possible to download the corresponding
packet list in a PCAP file. When a conversation is selected, all its packets are written into
the PCAP file. Packets will only appear once (even if they belong to multiple conversations).
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7. Search: It is possible to search in packets’ headers (IP address, port numnber) as well as
in their payloads.
At the end of the project, it is time to reconsider the requirements that have been established
at the beginning to see if they have been fulfilled. Table 8.1 shows an objective summary of the
state of the project. The election of the appropriate architecture allows to respect all projects
constraints. But some functionalities are still missing:
• (P6) List information of each IP address the mobile device connects to (name resolution,
geographic location, appearances in abuse databases, etc.)
• (P7) List files accessed (read and write mode) during the session by each application (only
possible with rooted/jailbroken devices).
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Table 8.1: Mono application vs Project requirements
To complete the specified system and fulfill functionality P7 (Files accessed), a new com-
ponent must be added to the system — a mobile application able to:
• implement an OpenVPN client
• relate sent packets to applications’ id
• explore files accessed by applications in read or write mode
Indeed, the mobile application we’ve used so far (OpenVPN for Android) implements the
OpenVPN client but cannot be extended to also address the last two items. Therefore, a new
mobile application should be created from scratch. This is one of the many possible follow-ups
of this project.
FunctionalityP6 (IP information) has not been implemented either due to time constraints.
Along with this initial functionality, during the development of the project we have also identified
several others that can improve the Mono system. We present hereafter a non-exhaustive list of
important features:
• User authentication system: As explained in section 7, the application is quite sensitive
and must be run on a public IP server. It is not desirable that anyone can connect to this
Web interface.
• Zip decompression: Often web pages are compressed. In order to quickly see its content
without using Wireshark, we would need to support TCP reassembly and decompress the
reassembled files, when we detect an archive (rar, zip, tar.gz)
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• File detection: If an application performs data-leakage, it would be interesting to know
which files are being sent and to see their content, specifically media files (images, video).
As previously stated, Mono would need to support TCP reassembly.
• Name resolution: As multiple domains can be associated to a same IP address, it would be
interesting (more meaningful) to perform name resolution by inspecting captured Domain
Name System (DNS) queries.
• Filtering system: the actual filtering system is quite limited. It is only possible to search
with a single string and see if it matches any field of the IP packet (IP, port, etc). It
would be profitable to have multiple filters (for instance to look for packets with a given
destination IP containing a given string) and also to filter packets within a given time
interval.
As the reader will agree, there is still room for improvement in this project. But let us put
forward the innovative architecture of this application that respects all the constraints to be
conveniently used in a network forensics investigation.
Amid all this gloom, perhaps we can take comfort from this one ray of hope.
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Glossary
ADB The Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is command-line tool to communicate with a device
(an emulator or a connected Android device) providing access to a unix shell.. 19
AJAX Method of exchanging data with a server, and updating parts of a web page without
reloading the entire page. 51
AP Access Point. 25
API Application Programming Interface. 16, 22, 27, 29, 34, 45
CN Common Name. 37, 38
DH The Diffie Hellman (DH) algorithm allows to exchange a shared secured key over an insecure
channel. It was named after Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. 31
DNS Domain Name System. 59
HPKP HTTP Public Key Pinning. 40
IP Internet Protocol. 42
JSON Javascript Object Notation. 51, 53
Local Storage Feature of the HTML 5 norm allowing web application to store data in the
memory of the Web Browser. It is an alternative to cookies that need to be included in every
server request, and only offer a small amount of memory. On the other hand with Local
Storage, the data does not move from the client machine and storage limit is larger: 5 MB vs
4 096 B for cookies. Ref: https://www.w3schools.com/html/html5_webstorage.asp.
49, 50
MITM Man In The Middle. 33, 42
NAT Network Address Translation. 30
NDK The Native Development Kit (NDK) is a toolset to implement parts of an application
using native-code languages such as C and C++. This can help you reuse code libraries
written in those languages. 19
NIC Network Interface Controller. 15, 22
RSA The RSA algorithm is an asymmetric cryptographic system. It was named after Ron Rivest,
Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. 31
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SAN The Server Name Indication is an optional field of an X509 certificate to include additional
identities to be bound to the subject of the certificate (email addresses, DNS names, IP
addresses). These identities are then allowed to present this certificate. 37
SNI The Server Name Indication is an optional field of the client hello message sent during a
TLS handshake that allows the client to indicate the domain name it wants to reach. This
way a same server can present multiple certificates on a given IP address with a given port.
37
SQL Structured Query Language. 9, 52–55
SSL The Secure Socket Layer is a cryptographic protocol that provides authentication, and
confidentiality to internet connections, originally created by Netscape. The versions of this
protocol are SSLv1 (never released,) SSLv2 (1994) and SSLv3 (1995). 9, 33, 37, 39, 57
TCP Transmission Control Protocol. 33, 35, 37–39, 42
TLS The Transport Layer Security protocol is the evolution of SSLv3. The versions of this
protocol are TLSv1.1 (2002) TLSv1.2 (2006) and TLSv1.3 (2014). TLSv1.3 is still a draft.
9, 33, 37–40, 53, 57
UDP User Datagram Protocol. 35, 39, 42
VPN Virtual Private Network. 3, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25–27, 29–31, 33, 39, 57
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network. 25
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